The Fed and Lehman Brothers
Setting the Record Straight on a Financial Disaster
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The Fed and Lehman Brothers
Acheter pour 22,26 $
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Narrateur(s):
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David Colacci
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Auteur(s):
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Laurence M. Ball
À propos de cet audio
The bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers was the pivotal event of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed. Ever since the bankruptcy, there has been heated debate about why the Federal Reserve did not rescue Lehman in the same way it rescued other financial institutions, such as Bear Stearns and AIG. The Fed's leaders from that time, especially former Chairman Ben Bernanke, have strongly asserted that they lacked the legal authority to save Lehman because it did not have adequate collateral for the loan it needed to survive.
Based on a meticulous four-year study of the Lehman case, The Fed and Lehman Brothers debunks the official narrative of the crisis. It shows that in reality, the Fed could have rescued Lehman but officials chose not to because of political pressures and because they underestimated the damage that the bankruptcy would do to the economy.
The compelling story of the Lehman collapse will interest anyone who cares about what caused the financial crisis, whether the leaders of the Federal Reserve have given accurate accounts of their actions, and how the Fed can prevent future financial disasters.
©2018 Cambridge University Press (P)2020 TantorWhile the main points presented in this book are clearly correct, I don't think it's a fair criticism of actions taken by anyone involved in the Lehman failure. It's a lot easier to solve a problem when you've got months in front of your laptop with no pressure and perfect information than it is to solve it over a weekend with the entire future of the global economy at stake, and imperfect information at best.
Also, baked into the entire thesis is the fundamental assumption that Lehman SHOULD have been "bailed out" (read: granted access to the PDCF). I didn't feel satisfied with the justification presented for this. I, and I'm sure a lot of others, came into this book believing it was correct for Lehman to fail, and this assumption was simply not adequately challenged.
I think this book either needed to be several chapters longer, or shortened to become an article. One way or another, I'd recommend sticking with the books (frequently cited in this book) by Sorkin, Paulsen, Bernanke and Geithner. You won't miss anything important skipping this one.
interesting at times, but not helpful
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