This is the sixth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

This episodes discusses:

How close did Japanese forces come to capturing Henderson Field in September 1942?
Why was Edson's Ridge the key terrain for defending Guadalcanal's airfield?
How did pre-registered artillery fire shape the outcome on Edson's Ridge?
What command decisions did Edson make when his defensive plan began to unravel?
How did the Marines adapt to Japanese infiltration tactics during the night attacks?
In what ways did Edson's Ridge save the Cactus Air Force?
Why did Kawaguchi underestimate the Marines defending Henderson Field?
What leadership failures forced the September purge of underperforming Marine officers?
How did logistics and fatigue shape the Marines' combat effectiveness on the ridge?
What lessons from Edson's Ridge matter for modern all-arms defensive planning?

Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for this episode.

https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

This is the fifth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

This episodes discusses:

Why was Henderson Field the single piece of decisive terrain on Guadalcanal?
How did Edson know the main Japanese attack would come over the ridge, not the beach?
What went wrong in Kawaguchi's three-pronged night attack on the Marine perimeter?
How did fragile Guadalcanal logistics shape the tempo in September 1942?
What made Edson's Ridge a natural avenue of approach to the airfield?
How did the Tanambogo/Gavutu raider actions tip the Marines to Japanese intentions?
What do Edson vs. Kawaguchi show about combat leadership in jungle/littoral fights?
How did malaria, dysentery, and hunger blunt Marine combat power before the battle?
Why did Vandegrift accept a thin, incomplete perimeter around Henderson Field?
How did daily Japanese air raids limit Marine prep of the ridge before 12–14 Sept 1942?

Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for this episode.

This is the fourth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

This episodes discusses:

How did the Marines employ the 37 mm gun firing canister at Alligator Creek?
Why did Colonel Ichiki attack without heavy weapons— trading firepower for speed and what was the cost?
What are the myths about scout Jacob Vouza?
How did barbed wire obstacles and coconut-log bunkers employed for to create an engagement zone?
How did pre-registered fires shape the Battle of Tenaru?
What early warnings did coastwatchers and patrols provide before the assault?
How did Marine tanks at dawn finish the fight across the sandbar?
What role did the Cactus Air Force play in the Battle of Tenaru?
Was Ichiki killed in action or by seppuku—what's the best evidence?
What operational lessons from Tenaru guided both sides at Henderson Field?

Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for this episode.

This is the third episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

This episodes discusses:

How the Marines seized conducted the landing and seized Guadalcanal's decisive terrain.
Red Beach landing bypasses IJA fortifications at Lunga Point.
Vandegrift prioritizes tight perimeter, airfield defense.
Carriers withdraw; logistics halved, myths debunked.
Japanese forces surprised and how they reacted.
Combined arms landings: infantry, artillery, engineers.
What really happened with the Goettge Patrol?
Logistics speed amphibious resupply.
Amtracs and beachmasters enable rapid combat buildup.
Modern littoral operations: enduring risk management lessons.

Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for this episode.

This is the second episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

Shoestring invasion planning
Koro rehearsals fiasco
Risking the aircraft carriers vs time to unload the convoy
Crutchley's covering cruisers
Rupertus leads Tulagi
Blue Beach landing
Fighting at "the Cut"
Improvised cave tactics
Gavutu–Tanambogo battles
Tanks combat

Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for this episode.

This is the first in a major series of podcasts looking at the Battles of Guadalcanal. This is an interview with Dave Holland.

This episode looks at:

Guadalcanal's strategic significance
Terrain and Climate of Guadalcanal
Development of Marine Amphibious Doctrine
Combat experience within the 1st Marine Division
Strength and structure of a Marine Division
US intelligence preparation before the landings
Japanese intelligence and intentions
US decision to land on Guadalcanal and Tulagi
Operation Shoestring

Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

This is the final episode of three in our series from our interview with Retired Colonel John Antal discussing his research into contemporary combat and how technology is changing the modern battlefield.

John makes a series of great points during the interview:

Modern War Is Fought in a Transparent Battlespace
Visibility through drones, sensors, and AI means traditional massing of forces is now lethal. You must deceive and disrupt enemy sensors or be destroyed.

Masking Should Be a Principle of War
Masking = multi-domain deception to confuse enemy ISR. Use decoys, optical/thermal camouflage, and emission control—make the enemy see what you want them to see.

Camouflage and Concealment Are Critically Neglected
Western armies (incl. U.S. and Australian) have virtually no meaningful camouflage training. Without drones for perspective or thermal checks, soldiers can't learn what the enemy sees.

Command Posts Are Death Traps
Tents and Winnebago-style mobile HQs are vulnerable to drone and artillery strikes. Forces must restructure command posts: smaller, distributed, better masked, and mobile.

Infiltration Is the Primary Tactic of Modern War
Seen in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and Gaza, infiltration bypasses strongpoints and succeeds in high-transparency environments where massing is suicidal.

Mobile Phones Kill Units
Civilian phones constantly emit signals. Unless militaries ban personal devices or deploy secure comms, they invite precision targeting.

Drones Are the Machine Guns of the 21st Century
Drones must be ubiquitous, especially at the squad level. But to manage this, armies need a dedicated drone corps—trained, maintained, and operationalised like any combat arm.

Resilience Beats Exquisite Systems
Over-reliance on billion-dollar platforms (e.g., B-2s, F-35s) is a strategic risk. Operation Spiderweb Cheap drones can destroy exquisite systems. Forces must be able to take hits and continue fighting.

Training Is Outdated and Unrealistic
Many exercises simulate conventional war (e.g., Desert Storm) rather than dispersed, dark, denied environments. We fall to the level of our training—not rise to our expectations.

Leaders Must Prepare for First Strike and Distributed Ops
The enemy will hit first. Western forces must train to disperse, operate without emissions, reassemble fast, and strike with real-time decision-making. The key: agility, initiative, and survivability.

Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

This is the second episode of our interview with Retired Colonel John Antal discussing his research into contemporary combat and how technology is changing the modern battlefield.

We discuss the lessons learnt from 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine and recent Israeli battles and how technology is changing the modern battlefield.

Check out the show notes for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.