Modern Strategy

In defiance of the stereotypes trotted out by yesterday's pundits, modern India's rise is both unusual and unexpected. It is unusual because some of the sharpest economic improvements are being observed in those sections of Indian society which were thought to be the most disadvantaged: women...

The Marine Corps has always considered itself a breed apart. Since 1775, America's smallest armed service has been suspicious of outsiders and deeply loyal to its traditions. Marines believe in nothing more strongly than the Corps' uniqueness and superiority, and this undying faith in its own exceptionalism is what has made the Marines one of the sharpest, swiftest tools of American military power. Along with unapologetic self-promotion, a strong sense of identity has enabled the Corps to exert a powerful influence on American politics and culture.

Imagine the impact on world history if Robert E. Lee had listened to General Longstreet at Gettysburg and withdrawn to higher ground instead of sending Pickett uphill against the entrenched Union line. Or if Napolon, at Waterloo, had avoided mistakes he'd never made before. The advice that would have changed the outcome of these crucial battles is found in a book on strategy written centuries before Christ was born.

To ascend the social hierarchies and achieve great power, you need to optimize and strategize rather than slogging and "working hard" every day of your life. This is counterproductive since it does not guarantee any beneficial results in the end. "Nobody can succeed by following rules in the first place. Rules were made by those the elites and those who have power to prevent the average masses below them and prevent them from succeed and gain power." Therefore, in order to do so and to make it among the top, you have to be ruthless and employ any tactic you know.

Small Wars, Big Data provides groundbreaking perspectives for how small wars can be better strategized and favorably won to the benefit of the local population.

In the dog days of August 2008, a column of Russian tanks and troops rolled across the Republic of Georgia’s northern border and into South Ossetia, sparking a war that was over almost before it began. The war, while not insignificant, lasted all of five days. The number of casualties did not exceed one thousand, the threshold most political scientists use to classify a war, although thousands of Georgians were displaced. By historical comparison, when Soviet tanks entered Hungary in 1956 and Afghanistan in 1979-89, the fatalities totaled 2,500 and roughly 14,000 respectively.