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Hindsight is 20/20: What We Got Wrong (and Right) About Russia's Military Before Ukraine

Hindsight is 20/20: What We Got Wrong (and Right) About Russia's Military Before Ukraine

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In 2018, experts gathered to discuss the modernization of Russia's ground forces. They talked about new technology, combined task forces, and a resurgent military power. But how accurate were those assessments in light of the brutal realities of the war in Ukraine?

In this episode, we revisit a 2018 analysis of the Russian military, contrasting pre-invasion expectations with the often-stark realities revealed on the Ukrainian battlefield. We'll explore where Western analysts were right, where they were wrong, and what crucial lessons we can learn from this retrospective.

Join us as we unpack:

  • The 2018 Vision of a Modernized Russian Army: Examine the pre-war assessments of Russia's ground forces, focusing on their perceived strengths in technology, combined arms operations, and strategic thinking.
  • The "Strelet" System: Promise vs. Reality: Analyze the claims about Russia's advanced "Strelet" communication and intelligence network and how its performance in Ukraine has measured up to expectations.
  • The UAV Deception?: Question the pre-war assessments of Russia's drone capabilities and explore why their performance in Ukraine has been less impressive than anticipated.
  • The Artillery Advantage: Right on Target: Acknowledge the accurate prediction of Russia's continued reliance on artillery as a central element of its military doctrine.
  • Logistics: The Achilles' Heel: Explore how pre-war concerns about Russian logistics and ammunition quality, often dismissed at the time, have proven to be remarkably prescient.
  • The Conscript Conundrum: Examine the impact of Russia's continued reliance on conscripts and its lack of a robust reserve system, highlighting how this has affected its performance in Ukraine.
  • Syria: A Misunderstood Testing Ground: Analyze how the Syrian conflict, often viewed as a limited intervention, provided valuable insights into Russian tactics and capabilities that were largely overlooked.
  • Cyber Warfare: The Unseen Front: Discuss the growing role of cyber warfare in modern conflict and how Russia's capabilities in this domain were underestimated.
  • The Geopolitical Blind Spot: Explore how the prevailing geopolitical climate in 2018, marked by strained US-Russia relations but a lack of anticipation for a major European war, may have skewed assessments of Russia's intentions.
  • The Dangers of Overestimation (and Underestimation): Understand the critical importance of accurately assessing an adversary's capabilities and intentions, avoiding both overconfidence and complacency.

We'll also consider:

  • The challenges of analyzing military capabilities in a closed society like Russia.
  • The role of misinformation and propaganda in shaping perceptions of military power.
  • The need for critical thinking and a willingness to challenge assumptions when assessing potential adversaries.

This episode is a crucial examination of how pre-conceived notions, incomplete information, and a failure to grasp the full strategic context can lead to flawed assessments of military power. Tune in to learn the vital lessons from the 2018 analysis of Russia's ground forces and how they can inform our understanding of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and future geopolitical challenges.

Tags: Russia, Ukraine War, Military Analysis, Russian Military, Ground Forces, Logistics, Training, Artillery, UAVs, Drones, Cyber Warfare, Strategic Thinking, Geopolitics, Intelligence, 2018 CSIS, Michael Kaufman, Dmitry Adamsky.

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