Épisodes

  • Navigating the Vortex | Ethnopolitics Edition | Episode 1

    Navigating the Vortex | Ethnopolitics Edition | Episode 1
    Nov 27 2025

    On 14 November 2025, we spoke to George Kyris about his article on the recognition of Palestine.

    George is an Associate Professor in International Politics at the University of Birmingham and the co-founder and chair of the ECPR Research Network on Statehood, Sovereignty and Conflict. You can find out more about him here.

    You can access the article we discuss in this episode here for free.

    The special issue on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Reflections on the Politics of Stalemate, co-edited by Karl Cordell, Brendan O’Leary and Stefan Wolff (Ethnopolitics 15(4), 2016), is available here.



    Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe
    Voir plus Voir moins
    21 min
  • Trump’s 28-point plan was the result of a well-timed Russian move.

    Trump’s 28-point plan was the result of a well-timed Russian move.
    Nov 26 2025
    Land for peace, take it or leave it. A deal proposed by the United States to end Russia’s war in Ukraine — negotiated in secret with Moscow — initially appeared to be an ultimatum to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy until his US counterpart Donald Trump said on Saturday (November 22) that it was not his “final offer”. Three days later, he reiterated that his original deadline was off.Kyiv and its allies rejected the draft as too favourable to Moscow and discussions on an “updated and refined peace framework” with Ukraine are ongoing. But it is the timing of the leaked 28-point plan that makes it interesting.Before details of this plan emerged, it seemed that Mr Trump was finally acting on his threat to sanction Russia for its invasion and force it to negotiate peace in good faith.Russia has offered no meaningful concessions on the maximalist demands it has stuck to since at least late 2022. There were no tangible outcomes after the Alaska summit between Mr Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in August. A follow-up summit was cancelled.Seemingly frustrated and targeting a crucial economic lifeline, Mr Trump ordered sanctions on two of Russia‘s oil majors — Rosneft and Lukoil — which took effect on November 21, albeit with a significant number waivers in place for one of the sanctioned companies, Lukoil. He threatened secondary sanctions on their foreign customers, especially in India, China, and Europe.And more importantly, he apparently gave the green light for US lawmakers to pursue legislation, first introduced in April, that would give him further powers to impose such primary and secondary sanctions.This is classic Russian timing. Just as the US president signals another hardening of his approach, the Russian side indicates a new-found flexibility regarding a deal on Ukraine. That was the case in April and May this year and again in July and August. Each time it appeared that Mr Trump was falling out with Mr Putin, and each time the Russian president managed to lure him back into the charade of Russian engagement — with a phone call in May and then with their summit in Alaska in August.Such moves to appear actively committed to peace negotiations have saved Mr Putin several times from more serious US measures in support of Ukraine.The timing was also advantageous for Russia because Mr Zelenskyy is under serious pressure from a new corruption scandal involving several people from his inner circle. Developments on the frontlines in the east and south of Ukraine, where Russia continues to make steady gains, also endanger Mr Zelenskyy‘s grip on power, making him potentially more likely to accept Russian demands.It is, therefore, not surprising that the original 28-point plan, despite at least some US co-authorship, had significant Russian input. The origins of this particular plan appear to be in an October meeting between US special envoy Steve Wittkoff, Mr Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Mr Putin’s close ally Kirill Dmitriev, who is the head of one of Russia‘s sovereign wealth funds. The plan was drafted outside the US’ so-called inter-agency process – which would have ensured close coordination, among others, between the state department, the defence department, and the national security council.Mr Dmitriev, by contrast, is unlikely to have acted outside the closely monitored power structures under Mr Putin‘s control. The Russian president‘s assertion that this was “essentially an updated plan“ of what had already been discussed in Alaska, that Russia simply “received … through the existing communication channels with the US administration” is hardly the full story.The source of the original leak story in Axios was an unnamed official on the American side. The plan’s murky origins and the flawed process through which the initial 28-point version of the plan emerged explain its messy contents which would have been a bad deal for Ukraine.Under the terms of what was first leaked, Ukraine would not just cede territory but lose more than what Russia currently — and illegally — occupies. The plan specifically required Ukrainian forces to withdraw from parts of Donetsk it controls, which is something that would be politically very hard for Mr Zelenskyy to accept. According to the original plan, Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk would be wholly considered Russian territory, while Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be frozen along the line of contact.Kyiv was also supposed to surrender sovereignty over key foreign policy decisions, such as its choice to pursue NATO membership, in exchange for weak security guarantees and vague promises for reconstruction. In the typical deal-making approach to foreign policy favoured by Mr Trump, the United States was to be compensated for providing any security guarantees and to profit handsomely from reconstruction projects in Ukraine once the war ended.Unsurprisingly, Mr Zelenskyy was not overly enthusiastic ...
    Voir plus Voir moins
    9 min
  • As US and Russia negotiate again behind Kyiv’s back, Ukrainian and European weakness is exposed

    As US and Russia negotiate again behind Kyiv’s back, Ukrainian and European weakness is exposed
    Nov 22 2025
    Renewed talk of no-longer secret negotiations between the Kremlin and the White House over a plan to end the war in Ukraine that heavily favours Russia has added to a broader sense of doom in Kyiv and among its western partners.Coupled with the continuing fallout from a sweeping corruption scandal among Ukraine’s elites and stalling efforts in Brussels to provide additional financial aid to Kyiv, a storm is brewing that may lead to Moscow prevailing in its war of aggression.However, this is not a foregone conclusion. True, Ukraine is having a very difficult time at the moment on various fronts. The fall of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine is a question of when, not if, and of how many men both sides will lose before Russia captures the ruins of the city.Russia has also upped pressure on the Zaporizhian part of the front and around Kherson on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. It is very likely that the Kremlin will continue to push its current advantages, with fighting possibly increasing in the north again around Ukraine’s second-largest city of Kharkiv.For now, the war of attrition clearly favours Russia. But from a purely military perspective, neither the fall of Pokrovsk nor further Russian territorial gains elsewhere spell the danger of an imminent Ukrainian collapse.However, war is never solely a military endeavour — it also requires political will and financial resources. A more existential threat to Ukraine’s war effort, therefore, is the continuing fallout from the corruption scandal. Here, too, certainties are few and far between.A characteristic feature of political scandals in Ukraine is the difficulty of predicting the reaction of Ukrainian society to them. Some incidents can become a trigger for large-scale protests that lead to massive change.This was the case with the Euromaidan revolution in 2014. The revolution triggered a chain of events from the annexation of Crimea to the Russian-proxy occupation of parts of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, to the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.By contrast, other political crises pass without major upheaval. This was the case with the dismissal of the popular commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, in 2024. Widely seen as a possible challenger to Volodymyr Zelensky in future presidential elections, Zaluzhnyi was subsequently sent into exile as Ukraine’s ambassador to London.So far, the current corruption scandal has not sparked mass protests in Ukraine. Nor has there been a very harsh response from European leaders. But the fact that virtually all of Zelensky’s inner circle is involved in corruption, according to Ukraine’s national anti-corruption bureau (Nabu), has forced the president to launch a comprehensive response.Sanctions were imposed on Timur Mindich, Zelensky’s long-term friend and business partner, who fled the country just hours before Nabu raids on November 10. Then, a week after the latest scandal broke, Ukraine’s parliament dismissed the ministers of justice and energy, German Galushchenko and Svitlana Hrynchukwho, who were both involved in the scandal.Meanwhile, Zelensky himself has embarked on a whistle-stop diplomatic tour of European capitals to shore up support for his beleaguered government and country.He managed to secure deliveries of US liquefied natural gas imports from Greece, which should help Ukraine through the difficult winter months. A landmark military deal with France also promises improved air defences for Ukraine in the short-term and the delivery of 100 fighter jets over the next decade.Important as they are, these are, at best, stop-gap measures rather than game changers. And not even all the necessary stop-gap measures are done deals. The EU and its member states are still prevaricating on an urgently needed loan to Ukraine. If this loan does not materialise, Kyiv will run out of money in February to pay its soldiers, civil servants and pensioners.In the meantime, Zelensky is also facing pressure from his own parliamentary faction, Servant of the People. He has presented his tour of Europe as a vote of confidence by his western allies. And, for now, he has avoided to offer the resignation of his long-time ally Andrii Yermak, who was also implicated in the latest corruption scandal.As head of the presidential office, Yermak is sometimes considered the de-facto ruler of Ukraine. Dismissing him — which is still a possibility, albeit a remote one — would probably please Zelensky’s domestic and foreign critics. But it would also be a further sign that Zelensky’s political power is, perhaps, fatally weakened.Critically missing in all of this are three things. The first is a Ukrainian succession plan. Opposition politicians like former president Petro Poroshenko and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko are both unpopular as they are tainted by allegations of corruption during their reigns.There is also no clear route to replacing Zelensky if he refuses to ...
    Voir plus Voir moins
    8 min
  • China does just enough to support Russia, just as the West does with Ukraine

    China does just enough to support Russia, just as the West does with Ukraine
    Nov 16 2025
    Considering Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin now meet semi-regularly — twice already in 2025 — the annual meetings of their heads of government could be considered fairly unremarkable, routine events. When Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin visited China on November 3 and 4 at the invitation of Premier Li Qiang, it was the 30th iteration of a practice that started in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.But since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, these meetings have taken on a significant degree of geopolitical importance.Together with the two countries’ interactions in organisations they dominate, like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the meetings serve as both symbolic reminders and operational enablers of the so-called no-limits partnership between Moscow and Beijing.Mr Mishustin’s visit to Hangzhou and Beijing, which included an audience with President Xi Jinping, must be seen in a broader context.It followed the first United States-China presidential summit of Donald Trump’s second term in office. On October 30 in South Korea, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping struck a temporary truce in their escalating trade war, climbing down on import tariffs and rare earth export controls.While the two leaders discussed Ukraine, Mr Trump said that they did not touch on the subject of China buying Russian oil, which has helped fund the Kremlin’s war.On October 23, Mr Trump had announced US sanctions on two of Russia’s major oil companies — Rosneft and Lukoil — in a bid to pressure Mr Putin to the negotiating table. Tightening the screws on Russia was a departure from Mr Trump’s approach so far and the sanctions are scheduled to take full effect on November 21.As a result, there have been some indications that state-owned Chinese refineries have begun to unravel at least some of their contracts with Russian suppliers. This may well be enough for Mr Trump to avoid imposing any further secondary sanctions on China which might otherwise undermine his efforts to negotiate a more favourable trade relationship with China.Even if Mr Trump were more determined to use America’s significant economic leverage in pursuit of peace in Ukraine, China is unlikely to bow to any pressure.On the contrary, the joint communique issued after Mr Li and Mr Mishustin’s meeting was unequivocal in reaffirming that “China and Russia will always regard each other as priority partners and … properly respond to external challenges,” including by making “all necessary efforts to cooperate with each other in opposing unilateral coercive measures.”The joint communique also repeated the now customary formula that “China supports Russia in safeguarding its own security and stability, national development and prosperity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and opposes interference in Russia’s internal affairs by external forces”.Rhetoric to one side, however, there is nothing to indicate a major step-change in Chinese support for Russia. Nevertheless, Beijing continues to provide Moscow with several lifelines. First, China remains one of the major importers of Russian oil and gas, which provides much-needed foreign income for the Russian treasury. China is also reportedly a major supplier of so-called dual-use goods, including semiconductors and machine tools that are critical to sustaining Russia’s defence industrial base.Second, a database of joint military exercises between Russia and China has recorded over 117 of them since 2003, with one-third over the last three-and-a-half years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.After some initial concerns, China also appears to have acquiesced to the military aid that North Korea has provided to Russia to date and that is likely to increase in the future. This was evident in the bonhomie between the three countries’ leaders at the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Beijing in September.And last, China has been crucial in preventing Russia’s international isolation, by maintaining high-level, high-visibility links at the bilateral level and through multilateral efforts.Officially, China remains committed to its February 2023 position paper on Ukraine, which starts with the assertion that the “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld”. Beyond this rhetoric, however, China has done little to work towards an end to the war.On the contrary, and the outcome of the Russia-China prime ministerial meeting suggests this, China’s approach appears to be aimed at providing enough support for Russia to help without directly and overtly supplying arms.China, much like the West does with Ukraine, likely does just enough to keep Russia’s war machine going but stops short of any game-changing moves.This is partly the result of Western pressure and the need to maintain a ...
    Voir plus Voir moins
    7 min
  • Ukraine's latest corruption scandal not only threatens to derail Zelensky’s government. It also undermines Kyiv's war effort.

    Ukraine's latest corruption scandal not only threatens to derail Zelensky’s government. It also undermines Kyiv's war effort.
    Nov 15 2025
    The latest corruption scandal that has engulfed Ukraine could not have come at a worse time or in a more delicate sector of the economy for the increasingly embattled government of Volodymyr Zelensky.Ukraine’s military is now clearly on the back foot in several key sectors of the frontline. Meanwhile, Russia’s campaign to devastate Ukraine’s energy sector is putting enormous pressure on the country’s infrastructure and bringing increasing hardship for ordinary Ukrainians as winter approaches.The fact that the latest corruption scandal involves the energy sector is, therefore, particularly damaging to the government and to public morale.Ukraine’s independent anti-corruption agencies have just released the findings of Operation Midas, a 15-month investigation into Energoatom, which is the state-owned operator of all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. With a total capacity of almost 14,000 megawatts, Energoatom is the largest electricity producer in Ukraine.Anti-corruption investigators allege a large kickback scheme of between 10% and 15% of the value of supplier contracts, amounting to about US$100 million. Raids were carried out in 70 locations around the country on November 10. Seven people have been charged and five are in custody.The mastermind of the corrupt scheme is alleged to be Timur Mindich — a businessman and film producer, who hastily fled Ukraine a day before the raids. What makes this very dangerous for Zelensky is that Mindich is the co-owner, with the Ukrainian president, of Kvartal 95 Studio, the media platform on which Zelensky established his pre-presidential fame as a comedian.The scandal, therefore, once again involves very close allies of the president. It risks tainting by association. But it also leaves him open to questions of whether he could have acted sooner about the allegations.The way in which this latest scandal unfolded also indicates that it is the manifestation of a much deeper conflict going on behind the scenes between elite groups vying for control of the last valuable state asset – the energy sector.It is the latest in a chain of events that goes back to the summer months, when Zelensky’s Servant of the People parliamentary faction tried to terminate the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies. Mass protests by young Ukrainians forced the government to backtrack on the decision.At this point, rumours about the existence of secretly taped conversations involving Mindich began to circulate in the Ukrainian media. However, no details of the content of the conversations were released at that time, leaving any allegations of corruption to the realm of speculation.As the government came under increasing pressure after massive Russian air strikes against the energy sector on October 10 which left Ukraine’s population without electricity for almost an entire day, the mud-slinging began in earnest. Attention focused on Volodymyr Kudrytsky, the former head of Ukrenergo, the main operator of Ukraine’s electricity grid.Kudrytsky, an outspoken figure in Ukraine’s pro-western and anti-corruption civil society, was detained on October 28 on suspicion of fraud relating to his alleged involvement in a 2018 plot to embezzle the equivalent of US$1.6 million from state funds. The investigation against him was conducted by the State Audit Service of Ukraine and the State Bureau of Investigation, which are directly subordinate to Zelensky.Kudrytsky has robustly defended his record against what he alleged were politically motivated attacks designed to shift the blame for the devastation of Ukraine’s energy grid by Russia’s air campaign away from the government. While Kudrytsky has been released on bail, the case against him remains live.Whatever their outcome in legal terms, the rumours circulating against Mindich and the attacks against Kudrytsky appear, for now at least, to be classic smear campaigns aimed at assassinating reputations and damaging the people and agendas associated with them.As they pit pro- and anti-Zelensky camps in Ukraine’s elite against each other, the latest corruption revelations shine a spotlight on the power struggle over who controls the state’s most valuable assets and the levers of power in Ukraine. If Zelensky’s enemies cannot remove him from power, then his ability to rule can at least be severely constrained by targeting close allies like Mindich.Another of Zelensky’s top advisers, justice minister German Galushchenko is also being investigated as a result of Operation Midas. Galushchenko is the former energy minister of Ukraine. He and his successor in the post, Svitlana Hrynchuk, both resigned. This elite infighting, which is engulfing a sector that is critical to Ukraine’s ability to continue resisting Russia’s aggression, is astounding in its disregard of the existential crisis engulfing Ukraine. While its outcome, for now, is unclear, several important conclusions can already be drawn from it.The ...
    Voir plus Voir moins
    8 min
  • The EU's assessment of Ukraine's progress toward membership is decidedly mixed. The report caps a bad month for Kyiv.

    The EU's assessment of Ukraine's progress toward membership is decidedly mixed. The report caps a bad month for Kyiv.
    Nov 6 2025
    Ukraine is having a tougher than usual time at the moment.On the frontlines, the battle for Pokrovsk is raging, and it does not look like Ukraine is winning it. Nor do things look good for the country’s energy resilience after months of an intensive Russian air campaign targeting key infrastructure. According to the UN, this could trigger another major humanitarian crisis in the already war-ravaged country.The geopolitical picture looks equally grim. The delivery of long-range Tomahawk missiles, sought by Kyiv for months now, has again been ruled out by US president Donald Trump. What’s more, after his meeting with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, in South Korea on October 30, Trump said that the US and China would work together to end the war in Ukraine.The possibility of a productive collaboration between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping on peace in Ukraine, let alone its successful conclusion, is remote. And even if there was a Washington-Beijing sponsored deal, it would not be in Ukraine’s favour. This became clear a few days later. During a high-profile two-day visit of the Russian prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, to China on November 3 and 4, Beijing showed no signs of backing out of its partnership with Russia which is key to sustaining the Kremlin’s war machine.Nor does the continuing delay in approving an EU loan to Ukraine worth €60 billion and backed by frozen Russian assets bode well for Kyiv. The disbursement of €1.8 billion from the EU’s Ukraine facility and a commitment by Germany to increase its aid to Kyiv next year by €3 billion are, of course, welcome demonstrations of European support. But they are not of the magnitude required to plug Ukraine’s budget deficit.Given all this bad news, it was no surprise that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, leapt at what, on the surface, looked like good news in the European commission’s latest assessment of Kyiv’s progress towards EU membership. Yet, more careful analysis of the 2025 commission report suggests that positive news, if any, is in the presentation, not the underlying facts.The European commission notes in its report that Ukraine has made progress in all of the 33 different chapters of the accession negotiations. That the commission found no instances of standstill or backsliding is as remarkable as it is commendable given that the country has achieved this in the shadow of Russia’s aggression since February 2022. Yet, in many areas, progress is modest at best. For example, in relation to the fight against corruption the commission reports that recent developments “cast doubts on Ukraine’s commitment to its anti-corruption agenda.” This is primarily a reference to attempts by Zelensky’s government to limit the independence of the country’s anti-corruption institutions. These triggered massive public protests last summer and forced a partial government climb-down. Concerningly, the commission also notes “political pressure on anti-corruption activists” and “harassment and intimidation of journalists”, including “cases of strategic lawsuits … related to journalistic investigations”.Closely related, the report laments that a “public procurement law was not adopted” and that a public-private partnership law that was passed by parliament has “significant gaps vis-à-vis EU standards.”Regarding the fight against serious and organised crime, the commission similarly states that “the freezing and confiscation of criminal assets remain very limited.” Other shortcomings concern limited progress on decentralisation, lack of transparency in recruitment to civil service positions, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and the persistence of torture and ill treatment in the prison and detention system.On the one hand, it is not surprising that these shortcomings exist. Ukraine has been fighting an existential war for almost four years. The country has only been a candidate country for EU membership since June 2022. Accession negotiations only started in December 2023.Yet it is the persistence of these highly visible, easily exploitable problems related to fundamental values of the EU that are causing concern. Almost identical issues were raised in the European commission’s opinion on Ukraine’s membership application in 2022, in its 2023 report on the country’s alignment with EU norms and laws, and in last year’s progress report on the accession negotiations.It may be an exaggeration to claim that Ukraine is experiencing a turn towards a more and more autocratic style of presidential government under Zelensky. But there clearly are signs that war-time politics in Kyiv has a darker side that does little to bolster the country’s credentials for EU membership. This provides easy ammunition for Ukraine’s detractors inside the EU. Chief among them is Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán, whose obstruction tactics have frustrated European commission efforts to...
    Voir plus Voir moins
    8 min
  • Despite another week of diplomatic whiplash, an end to the fighting in Ukraine is not in sight

    Despite another week of diplomatic whiplash, an end to the fighting in Ukraine is not in sight
    Oct 28 2025
    Following another week of diplomatic flip-flopping in the United States, Ukraine’s European allies did not disappoint when it came to the fulsomeness of their diplomatic rhetoric. Yet concrete action to strengthen the capabilities Ukraine needs to win the war remained at a snail’s pace.After a less than successful meeting in the White House on October 17 between the American and Ukrainian presidents, Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s European allies once again scrambled to respond to US equivocation with public affirmations of support for Kyiv.A meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday, October 20, a summit of EU leaders on Thursday, October 23, and a gathering of the coalition of the willing on Friday, October 24, provided plenty of opportunities for such statements. For good measure, the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, paid a visit to Washington on October 21 and 22, before joining the leaders of the coalition of the willing on Friday, October 24.The core message from all these meetings was that where the Trump administration sends ambiguous signals, Ukraine’s more steadfast European supporters are still keen to demonstrate their mettle.When they met on Monday in Brussels, EU foreign ministers had a packed agenda. On Ukraine, the EU’s foreign affairs chief, Kaja Kallas, reiterated the bloc’s support for what she described as “Trump’s efforts to end the war” and condemned Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.The following day, Tuesday, October 21, brought diplomatic whiplash, when it transpired that there had been another apparent shift in the White House. The planned Budapest summit between Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, was postponed until further notice. The supposed host, Hungary’s Kremlin-friendly prime minister, Viktor Orban, and Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, maintained that preparations for the meeting were continuing. But Trump was unequivocal. He would not waste time on a meeting if a peace deal was not a realistic prospect.In an unusual moment of clarity, the US president then appeared to realise that he needed to demonstrate actual consequences for Russia obstructing a peace agreement. On October 22, the US announced sanctions on two of Russia’s largest oil companies – Rosneft and Lukoil. This was the first sanctions package imposed by the US on Russia in Trump’s second term.There is a grace period until November 21 to allow for the necessary winding down of transactions with, and divestment from, the two companies. Nonetheless, the mere announcement of the sanctions has already led to major Indian and Chinese clients beginning to pull out from their deals with these two Russian energy giants. Additional sanctions against Russia’s banking sector and companies involved in oil infrastructure are apparently also being contemplated in the White House.After much deliberation to overcome internal divisions, the EU followed suit. On October 23, Brussels announced its 19th package of sanctions against Russia. This also targeted an oil trader and two refineries in China, as well as banks in Central Asia.In addition, the EU confirmed that a decision had been taken on the rules of the transition to a complete ban on any Russian gas imports. This will take full effect at the end of 2027.All these efforts are critical to increasing pressure on Russia and are long overdue. But their immediate effect is uncertain. Russia has responded with the usual performative defiance. It has tested a new nuclear-powered missile and carried out a readiness drill for the country’s nuclear forces, overseen directly by Putin.With Russia’s air and ground wars against Ukraine continuing unabated, the other major challenge for Kyiv’s allies is providing assistance to the embattled country.Here, progress has stalled. The US continues to withhold permission for Ukraine to use long-range missiles against targets deep inside of Russia. The mooted supply of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by the US has been scotched. Meeting with leaders of the coalition of the willing on Friday, Zelensky kept pressing for deep-strike weapons, stressing that when the US threatened to supply Tomahawks to Ukraine, Putin was willing to negotiate.Even more pressing is the issue of how to cover Ukraine’s financial needs. Kyiv’s most recent estimate of the country’s unmet external financing needs for 2026-27 stands at US$60 billion (£45 billion).At the European Council meeting on October 23, leaders reiterated their commitment to “continue to provide, in coordination with like-minded partners and allies, comprehensive political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people”. However, crucially, no agreement was reached on how the necessary funds would be mobilised.There is strong support for using frozen Russian assets to assist Ukraine, including from the coalition of the willing and the US. A proposal to ...
    Voir plus Voir moins
    7 min
  • How and why does Putin play Trump?

    How and why does Putin play Trump?
    Oct 21 2025
    Within twenty-four hours last week, US president Donald Trump performed yet another pivot in his approach to the Russian war against Ukraine. It is almost customary for him now to first express anger and frustration with his Russian counter-part, Vladimir Putin, then to threaten severe consequences, and finally to find some imaginary silver lining that, in his considered view alone, justifies backing down and essentially dancing to the Russian dictator’s tune again.The latest iteration of this by now very predictable sequence of events unfolded as follows. Back in September, while he was still busy pushing his ultimately unsuccessful campaign to be awarded the Nobel peace prize, the US president began to envisage a Ukrainian victory against Russia that would see Kyiv reclaim all territories lost to Russia’s aggression beginning with the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.To make this happen, there was suddenly talk of US deliveries of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, which would have enabled strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure far beyond the current reach of most of Ukraine’s weapons. Despite some doubt about the logistical feasibility of such deliveries, especially in sufficiently large quantities, there was a widespread expectation that the necessary details were being worked out during two phone calls between Trump and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, on October 11 and 12. A deal was meant to be announced after their meeting in the White House, scheduled for October 17.Yet, the day before that meeting, Trump, apparently at the Kremlin’s request, took a phone call from Putin. Over the course of two hours of flattery and promises of reinvigorated trade relations, the Russian president managed to get Trump to back off his threat to supply Ukraine with Tomahawks.This message was promptly delivered the following day to the Ukrainian delegation led by Zelensky. While clearly not as disastrous as their first encounter in the White House in February this year, Ukraine’s humiliation was clear. Not only were Tomahawks taken off the table, but Kyiv and its European allies are essentially back to square one and the very real possibility of a deal between Putin and Trump. Or rather two deals to be hammered out by senior officials first and then sealed at another Trump-Putin summit in Budapest. The first deal would likely be on the broader terms of a peace settlement. After the meeting with Zelensky, Trump posted on his social media channel that Russia and Ukraine should simply accept the current status quo and stop the fighting. Trump thus appears determined — again — to stop the fighting in Ukraine on the basis of a compromise between Russia and Ukraine. A compromise, however, which means that Ukraine would lose as much as 20% of its internationally recognised territory — something that Kyiv and its European allies have repeatedly rejected as unacceptable.The second deal would be on resetting relations between Washington and Moscow. This is something that Trump has been keen on for some time and suggests that more severe sanctions on Russia and its enablers, including India and China, are unlikely forthcoming any time soon.Before Zelensky’s trip to Washington, there appeared to be some genuine hope that a ceasefire could be established as early as November. But Trump’s arrangements with Putin do not mention a ceasefire at all and make an end to the fighting conditional on a deal between the American and Russian presidents, which Zelensky is then simply expected to accept. This will put further pressure on Ukraine which continues to suffer from daily attacks against critical infrastructure that are particularly harmful to the country’s economy and civilian population and foreshadow another difficult winter.So far so bad for Ukraine. But this was not an accidental outcome that could have gone the other way, depending on the whims of Trump. Ever since the US president appeared to shift gear in his approach to the war in late September, the Kremlin carefully prepared the ground for a rapprochement between the two presidents — with a mixture of concern, threats, and a good dose of flattery.The goal of this rapprochement, however, is not a better peace deal for Russia, which Putin surely knows is unrealistic. Rather, it appears, the Kremlin’s main goal was buying itself more time for the continuation of its costly but at least somewhat successful ground offensive along the frontlines in Ukraine’s Donbas region where Moscow does not control all of the territory it has formally annexed.And buying time is best achieved by preventing the US from fully backing the position of Ukraine and its European allies. In this context, the choice of venue for a potentially deal-clinching summit between Trump and Putin is also interesting. Given Hungary’s location, it will not be possible for Putin to get to Budapest without travelling through NATO airspace and ...
    Voir plus Voir moins
    8 min